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Philosophy and Theology

As I discussed in the Winter 2012 issue of this journal, after the online publication
of Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva’s article “After-Birth Abortion: Why
Should the Baby Live?” there was an immediate and almost overwhelmingly negative
reaction from around the world.1 Now their article has been published in the print
version of the Journal of Medical Ethics, alongside more than twenty reflections
and reactions to it.2
The essays, on the whole, are disappointing. For the most part, these articles
rehash old arguments—in some cases arguments that were first put forward four
decades ago. This is not altogether surprising, since Giubilini and Minerva’s article
recycles (in a less sophisticated form) Michael Tooley’s defense of infanticide from
1972.3
One of the best of these essays is “Yes, the Baby Should Live: A Pro-Choice
Response to Giubilini and Minerva,” by Bertha Alvarez Manninen.4 Manninen points
out, quite rightly, that Giubilini and Minerva’s view may even allow the killing of
three-year-old children who do not in all cases fulfill Locke’s definition of a person:
“a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times, and places; which it does only
by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me,

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, “After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the
Baby Live?,” Journal of Medical Ethics, published online (February 23, 2012).
2
Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, “After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the
Baby Live?,” Journal of Medical Ethics 39.5 (May 2013): 261–263.
3
Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2.1
(1972): 37–65.
4
Bertha Alvarez Manninen, “Yes, the Baby Should Live: A Pro-Choice Response to
Giubilini and Minerva,” Journal of Medical Ethics 39.5 (May 2013): 330–335.
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essential to it.’” 5 Giubilini, Minerva, and Tooley surely are aware that their position
entails the conclusion that children two or three years of age do not have a right to
live. But they lack the courage of conviction to state this implication explicitly.
Manninen notes that “the mental traits they argue [are] a prerequisite to
p ossessing a right to life do not appear overnight, and they are not lost instantaneously
either. Is the right to life a gradient right? Does a 1-year-old have just a little bit of
that right—less than a 5-year-old, but more than a neonate? If an elderly individual
begins the degeneration into Alzheimer’s disease, does her right to life become
gradually weaker? ” 6 This insight could be developed into what is sometimes called
the equality argument. If our moral rights are based on degreed characteristics, then
the more we have of a value-making characteristic, the greater the value we have and
the greater the right to life we have. But this contradicts the widely held notion that
all human persons have fundamentally equal rights. As John Finnis points out in his
contribution, “The declarations of human equality (factual and moral) were solemnly
reaffirmed after the sobering, thought-provoking experiences of the mid-20th century.
They are a better standard for confirmation of a critically philosophical argument
about these matters than is provided by laws and conventions all too easily (but truly)
explicable by reference to the self-interest of people who relative to the human beings
under discussion in Giubilini and Minerva’s paper are people of power.” 7
Giubilini and Minerva deny that the newborn has equal rights, because they
hold that the neonate does not have an interest in living. Manninen, following Steinbock and others, denies this by distinguishing between two meanings of “interest.”
A person has an objective interest in something (what Manninen calls “interest 1 ”)
and a subjective interest (what Manninen calls “interest 2 ”).8 Nonhuman animals
have an objective interest in receiving vaccinations so that they do not get sick and
die, but they do not have a subjective interest in such vaccinations because they do
not know what “health” is, nor do they know the connections between vaccinations
and health or envision what their life will be like if they do not get vaccinations.
Similarly, Manninen points out that children who are mentally handicapped have an
objective interest in becoming educated to a greater degree (interest 1 ) even though
they may not subjectively be interested in getting an education (interest 2 ). Clearly, a
human being can be benefited without appreciating it, caring about it, or even being
aware of it. So too a human being can be harmed without appreciating it, caring
about it, or even being aware of it. Benefit and harm are similar in that one makes
John Locke quoted in ibid., 333. The original context of John Locke’s account of a
person as a source of responsibility who can reflect on prior action and plan for future action
is perfectly sensible. It makes no sense to hold a human being accountable for his or her
actions unless that human being is a source of responsibility. Without robust self-reflection
and memory, a person cannot be held accountable for his or her actions. Yet, if we really hold
that the right to live is tied to the ability to be a source of responsibility, then full moral status
does not begin until the so-called age of reason, customarily held to be seven years of age.
6
Ibid.
7
John Finnis, “Capacity, Harm and Experience in the Life of Persons as Equals,”
Journal of Medical Ethics 39.5 (May 2013): 283.
8
Manninen, “Yes, the Baby Should Live,” 333.
5
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an individual better off and the other makes an individual worse off, but having
an interest2 is not necessary to have an interest1. Indeed, sometimes what a person
is subjectively interested in gaining will actually be detrimental to what would be
objectively good to have, such as drugs for an addict who desperately wants another
fix and equally desperately wants to avoid rehabilitation.
Manninen’s arguments from objective interests for attributing moral status
to newborn human beings can also be applied to prenatal human beings. Unborn
children too have an objective interest in living. Nevertheless, Manninen seeks
to defend the conventional pro-choice view that infanticide is impermissible but
abortion is permissible. She does not hold that neonatal human beings and prenatal
human beings late in pregnancy differ intrinsically in their moral status. Rather, she
justifies her defense of abortion by a version of the violinist argument. She writes,
No person (whether intrauterine or extrauterine) has a right to use the body of
another for sustenance. In this sense, embryos and fetuses would be entitled
to the same care and protection as any other person—while the vulnerable
need care and protection, that protection can never extend to the point that the
bodily autonomy of another may be violated. A sick patient in need of a bone
marrow transplant, for example, should be cared for and protected as much
as possible, and every avenue available to secure him a bone marrow transplant should be pursued. However, it would never be permissible to forcibly
extract bone marrow from an unwilling “donor”, and our refusal to do so is
not typically interpreted as a refusal to care for the patient. Similarly, if it
were possible to care for an embryo or fetus without encroaching on another
person’s bodily autonomy, then I would favour pursing that option and, if a
fetus survives an abortion, then I do believe the infant should be given the
same level of care and protection as any comparable newborn.9

According to this variation of the violinist argument, Manninen concludes that
“every person has a right to decide if they wish to use their body to sustain the life
of another.” I’m not sure this is true.
Imagine a father with his baby alone in a distant mountaintop cabin cut off from
all forms of communication. At a certain point, the baby cries out for food, but the
man is busy playing video games and says to himself, “To feed this hungry baby, I’d
have to get up from my game, prepare a bottle, and then probably also hold the baby
while she eats. I do not wish to use my body in this way. I have the right to decide if
I wish to use my body to sustain another person. In doing this, I am doing nothing
whatsoever wrong, since I am an autonomous person, and my body is free for me to
use as I please.” As the weekend passes, the baby repeatedly cries out for food, and
the man repeatedly invokes his previously mentioned ethical rationalization. When
the baby dies, can we really claim that the father of this child has done nothing wrong?
One retort might be that the father in staying with the baby in the cabin has
implicitly agreed to take on the responsibility for caring for the baby. But we can
change the scenario to account for this objection. The father was simply visiting the
cabin, and the mother took off from the isolated cabin in the only car available and
left the father and baby there alone before the father made any (implicit) agreement.

   9

Ibid., 334, note ii.
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It will be retorted that pregnancy is much more difficult for a mother than
s etting aside a video game is for the father. But what is at issue is not the amount of
sacrifice involved in continuing a pregnancy or in caring for a newborn. The amount
of sacrifice will vary widely depending on the circumstances of the pregnancy and
the circumstances of caring for a newborn. Some pregnancies will be much easier to
continue than some cases of caring for neonates. In other cases, caring for a neonate
will be much more difficult than continuing a pregnancy, especially since some women
do not even realize that they are pregnant.10 The example of the father playing video
games and fatally neglecting his baby is meant to indicate that it is not true that parents
have an absolute right to decide if they wish to use their body to sustain the life of
their own dependent child. Parents have moral (and often legal) duties to provide basic
care for their dependent minor children, even if they must use their bodies to do so.
However, Manninen is correct that is it wrong, seriously wrong, to forcibly
extract bone marrow from an unwilling “donor.” But this insight does not justify
abortion. In fact, it leads to the condemnation of most abortions. In typical cases of
abortion, the bodily integrity of a prenatal body is forcibly violated as the human
being in utero is violently dismembered and torn limb by limb out of the uterus. If
forcibly extracting bone marrow from a person who is able to survive the extraction
is wrong, a fortiori lethal dismemberment of a person’s entire body is wrong.
Nor it is accurate to characterize abortion as simply the mother withdrawing aid
and declining to use her body to support another person. An abortion, at least as far
as the abortionist is concerned, is aimed at causing the death of the human being in
utero (usually by dismemberment), not merely separating him or her from his or her
mother. (I use the gendered possessive pronoun intentionally, for a prenatal human
being is a “him” or “her” as much as a postnatal human being is). The criminal case
of Kermit Gosnell was about botched abortions in which he failed to do what he
had initially attempted to do. If he had successfully killed the prenatal children as
he was attempting to do in the abortions, he would have never been convicted of
killing postnatal children. Nor is abortion properly characterized as “terminating a
pregnancy,” for “selective reduction” of a pregnancy, in which one twin is killed while
the other twin is allowed to live, does not terminate a pregnancy but is nevertheless
a case of abortion. In sum, Manninen’s arguments do not succeed in differentiating
the killing of neonates from the killing of prenatal human beings.
Neil Levy argues that neonates differ in moral status from prenatal human
beings because “birth is a necessary condition for the acquisition of important
psychological properties (together, perhaps, with the fact that birth correlates
reasonably well with age) that explains why people think it is morally significant.” 11
One difficulty with this suggestion is that while birth may be a necessary condition
for acquiring important psychological properties, there are many other necessary

Jessica Jerreat, “Mother-of-Three Training for a Half Marathon Leaves Practice
with a Sore Back, Discovers It’s Actually Labor Pains and Gives Birth to a Surprise Baby,”
MailOnline.com, June 5, 2013.
11
Neil Levy, “The Moral Significance of Being Born,” Journal of Medical Ethics
39.5 (May 2013): 327.
10
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conditions for acquiring important psychological properties, such as having someone
physically care for the newborn, speaking with the growing child, and being a living
member of a species that can have such mental properties. The question then arises
why having this necessary condition grants increased moral status while having
these other necessary conditions does not. Why is birth so important and not, for
example, verbal communication? Surely, feral children have basic rights even though,
because of their lack of the necessary condition of conversation, they have developed
psychological properties no greater than other nonhuman animals.
In “Of Course the Baby Should Live: Against ‘After-Birth Abortion.’ ” Regina A.
Rini argues that a neonatal human being and a prenatal human being have differing
moral status because the former has aims and the latter does not:
Specifically, the human being becomes biologically independent of its mother,
in such a way that it begins to have aims that it did not before. In the womb, a
fetus is essentially passive regarding its own needs, which are provided directly
by the umbilical cord and uterine environment. A newborn infant, once its
umbilical cord has been severed, must suddenly begin to breathe on its own,
to process its own nutrients, to digest and excrete and seek out warmth. It
must almost immediately begin responding to these needs, playing the tiniest
role in their accomplishment through its grasping, suckling and crying. As I
suggested in the last section, these needs, along with the means to accomplish
them, are very plausibly understood as “aims”, at least to a similar extent that
animals and certain disabled adults have aims. Newborn infants have aims,
but fetuses do not. Therefore, if the vulnerability of such aims to frustration
is morally significant, then there is a morally relevant difference between a
fetus and a newborn. (N1) is false, so the Natal and Prenatal Equivalence
Arguments both fail.12

The argument may be interpreted in a number of ways. Is it is the baby’s grasping,
suckling, and crying that make the significant difference? All these are sometimes
done in utero prior to birth. Is it is breathing on her own, processing her own nutrients,
digesting, excreting, and seeking out warmth that make a baby girl have greater status
than an unborn girl? It is hard to see why any of these things is morally important.
Any rat or frog is capable of such activities, which are mere instincts rather than
rationally chosen “aims.” Nor is it true that all prenatal human beings lack “aims”
in the primitive, instinctive sense.
As reported in Scientific American:
Researchers at the University of Turin and the University of Parma in Italy
used ultrasonography, a technique for imaging internal body structures, to
track the motion of five pairs of twin fetuses in daily 20-minute sessions. As
published in the October PLoS ONE, the scientists found that fetuses begin
reaching toward their neighbors by the 14th week of gestation. Over the following weeks they reduced the number of movements toward themselves and
instead reached more frequently toward their counterparts. By the 18th week
they spent more time contacting their partners than themselves or the walls

Regina A. Rini, “Of Course the Baby Should Live: Against ‘After-Birth Abortion,’ ”
Journal of Medical Ethics 39.5 (May 2013): 356.
12
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of the uterus. Almost 30 percent of their movements were directed toward
their prenatal companions. These movements, such as stroking the head or
back, lasted longer and were more accurate than self-directed actions, such
as touching their own eyes or mouth. The results suggest that twin fetuses
are aware of their counterparts in the womb, that they prefer to interact with
them, and that they respond to them in special ways. Contact between them
appeared to be planned—not an accidental outcome of spatial proximity, says
study co-author Cristina Becchio of Turin.13

If this research is accurate, twins in utero have “aims” at least as much as newborns.
So are we then to conclude, using Rini’s line of argument, that abortion of a singleton
is permissible but abortion of twins is not?
In “Abortion, Infanticide and Moral Context,” Lindsey Porter attempts to
d ifferentiate between abortion and infanticide in the following way: “Where, when
pregnant, the woman is in a unique and singular sort of a relation with the fetus,
such that it makes perfect sense to say that the choice is hers, this is simply not so
once the newborn is outside her body. The baby is then—almost always—in various
sorts of relationships with several or even many people. And where two progenitors
are involved with a birth, the relationship between the woman and the baby is not
even unique: the would-be father stands in the same potential-care-relation to the
newborn that the would-be mother does.” 14 This analysis does not, in fact, distinguish
all cases of abortion from all cases of infanticide. As just noted, prenatal twins are
in a relationship with each other, yet presumably this does not change the permissibility of aborting twins. In some cases of (potential) infanticide, the woman is in
a singular unique relationship with the baby. I am thinking of all cases in which a
woman gives birth alone. She, and she alone, actually has a relationship with the
newborn child such that she and she alone can care for that child. Furthermore,
why does it make a difference to the moral status of a human being that the unique
bodily relationship of the pregnant mother and her child is ended at birth? Indeed,
once born, the infant is able to negatively impinge on the interests of more people.
Only after birth would a baby disturb others, cause economic hardship, and strain
the requirements of sleep of not just one person but many. So if the interests of one
actual person outweigh the interests of a potential person (the baby on Giubilini
and Minerva’s view), how much more would the interests of many actual persons
outweigh the interest of one potential person. Reflections in the recent literature
suggest the following conclusion: the arguments given against infanticide typically
also undermine abortion; the arguments for abortion typically justify infanticide.
C hr istopher K aczor
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